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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N.
Guardianship under the Roman Law.
In the Roman Law, there were two different kinds
of Guardianship recognized, viz., Tuteta, or Tutor-
ship, and Cura, or Curatorship.
The Tutorship of minors, by the Roman Law, was the
power and right of a Roman citizen to supply, by his
authority the declaration of Will of a Minor Roman cit-
izen who was sui juris in his legal acts, to fully
represent him therein where this was allowed, and to
manage his estate. From an original right of the
nearest legal heirs of the minor, or on him by whom
the father, by virtue of his paternal power, by his
last Will conferred it. At a subsequent period it be-
came a legal duty, which every person to whom for any
legal reason it was offered, had to accept, viz., on
testamentary appointment on legal prescript or by di-
rection of the Government. The person to whom it was
given was termed the Tutor, the subject was termed the
Pupil. The Tutorship of the minor was legally nec-
essary, and did not depend on the Pupil's will, whether
he should have a Tutor or not. Tutorship was made a
public duty, every one to whom it had rightfully been
offered was bound to accept. There was, however, cer-
tain excuses which could be given, namely, If the Tutor
was more than seventy years of age, or filled a Gov-
ernmental position. All Tutors were required to give
security for the performance of their duties, except
the Testamentary Tutor, who was absolved from giving
security. Every Tutor, called to Tutorship, if he did
not properly excuse himself, must undertake it from the
moment that he was apprised of his appointment; in
default thereof, he was liable to all damages to the
Pupil that might arise from such neglect. Every Tutor
also had to be sworn. The rights and duties of the
Tutor during Tutorship, related partly to the Pupil's
physical person, to his legal personality, in the legal
training undertaken by him, and also to the management
of the Pupil's estate. The Tutor's chief duty con-
sisted in the protection of the Pupil, that is, he must
wholly represent the Pupil's legal personality in his
lawful acts, or supply it by his authority, and thereby
protect him against harm, which otherwise might result
from either total lack of, or at least imperfect legal
capacity to act. Hence, so long as the Pupil was an
infant and could not act for himself, the Tutor must
represent him in such lawful acts as could not be
committed without harm to the Pupil; but as soon as the
Pupil became of age, and could act for himself, the im-
perfect legal personality was then supplied by the
Tutor consenting to the Pupil's transactions. This
authority is requisite in all transactions of the
Pupil which affect a change of his status, or whereby
something of his was relinquished, or any of his
rights were conceded to another, and where an obliga-
tion was assumed by him. Such authority was not
requisite to a transaction whereby the Pupil only
acquired rights, or was released from an obligation.
If the authority was wanting where it was required by
the strict civil law, the transaction was invalidated,
and if it depended upon mutual performances, the Pupil
could sue thereon, but could not be sued; but, if the
Tutor interposed his authority by the strict civil law
the transaction bound the Pupil. However, if the
Pupil was injured by it, he still had his right to
prayer for restitution. Every Tutor was clothed with
authority. If, however, the Tutor himself or a person
subject to his power, entered into a transaction with
the Pupil, he could not, by reason of this authority
conferred upon him, validate the transaction. The form
of the Tutor's authority required that he be present
at the undertaking of the transaction. The Tutor at
such time, must verbally and without force, uncondi-
tionally consent, and if one of these requisites was
lacking, the authority wasx invalid. Every one who
was not a Tutor, but yet acted as such, was termed a
False Tutor, but, in a narrower sense, there was the
following distinction. When one not a Tutor managed
the property of the infant, he was termed the Protector
or one who transacted business for a Tutor, and if he
acted as a Tutor, he still took upon himself, the same
duties as the Real Tutor. The Pupil had the right to
insist on his immediate removal, as soon as it appeared
that he was not the Real Tutor. The Tutorship was
ended in two ways : 1. Rightfully, (a) When the Pupil
reached the age of puberty, (b) When the Tutor died,
or (c) suffered a loss of status, (d) When he was
appointed for a certain period of time only, or until
the performance of a condition, and the time had
expired or the condition had been performed, or (e)
when the mother who ministered the Tutorship of her
children, married again. 2. By Judicial permission,
(a) at the Tutor's instance, if sufficient excuse be
given, (b) against the Tutor's will if he be suspected of
not performing his duties with proper fidelity, or
even if he only give cause to fear this, and his re-
moval was therefore necessary or at least advisable.
Curatorship.
Curatorship was a charge imposed upon one by the
Law or Government, for the care of the person or the
management of the affairs of another, who, for a par-
ticular reason was incapable, or was regarded as
incapable to care for himself or his estate. He upon
whom such charge was imposed, was termed the Curator.
With respect to the extent and capacity of Curatorship,
it was divided as follows : 1. Perfect and imperfect
Curatorship; according as they have had the full right
of administration conferred upon them, or only the
custody of the property connected with a right to
alien things which could not be preserved. 2. Curator-
ship of the person or of the property, the former re-
lated to the wellfare and personal necessities of the
Curatee, the latter related only to the management of
the property. 3. Curatorship general and special; the
former related to the entire estate, the latter, to
only a particular transaction of the Curatee. The
Curator must be capable of undertaking the duties of his
office; if he was capable, he was bound to undertake
it. Curators were appointed in the following cases
(a) When the minor was in litigation, (b) When he was
to receive payment of a debt from his debtor, (c) When
his former Tutor rendered an account of his adminis-
tration, Excepting in these cases, the minor received
a Curator only for the management of his estate. When
the Pupil himself petitioned for one, he must retain
him till he reached his majority. When the Curatee
received at his solicitation, a permanent Curator-for the
management of his estate, he could, notwithstanding, bind
himself and his estate without the Curator's consent, by
contract, and other lawful acts. Such transactions
were not invalid because of the lack of the Curator's
consent, but if the interests of the minor were in-
jured, he might, to be restored, petition to have his
age investigated, even if his Curator should have con-
sented to the transaction. When he had sold, pledged,
or hypothecated his things, or undertook a transacti-on
for which, by a legal prescript, every minor must have
a Curator, then the Curator's consent was necessary for
its validity. By the lack of such consent, for the
minor's advantage, such transactions were invalid, and
restitution was required, but if the Curator consented,
then by the strict civil law the minor was bound. How-
ever, the minor always had his right, by petition, to be
restored. The Curatorship of a minor ceased, (a) When
the minor or Curator died, (b) When either suffered a
loss of status, (c) When the minor attained his ma-
jority, (d) When the Curator was removed because sus-
pected of some wrong, (e) When the Curator was appointed
for some period of time, and the time has expired.
After the Tutorship and Curatorship had expired, they
were bound to give an account of their administration.
The ward's father could riot release them from this
duty, but however, he who was ward, might, if the
account be stated to the ward during his minority. A
Tutor was appointed to assist him in the account. The
inventory formed the basis of the account, and the
receipts and expenditures had to be precisely specified,
and every item must be supported by vouchers. After
the account had been closed, the Tutor or Curator must
transfer the remaining estate, with interest from the
7
day of closing. The ward had a lien on the Guardian's
entire estate as security for the faithful adminis-
tration of the Tutorship or Curatorship, for the
transfer of property, and for the payment of damages
by the Tutor or Curator. The Pupil could sue the
Tutor for the performance of his duties, especially in
relation to the administration of the estate, against
which the Tutor had his action for indemnity for what
he expended of his own means, for the Pupil's benefit. 2
The Tutor or Curator who had fraudulently appropriated
the ward's property, was liable for a double amount
of the property so appropriated.
CHAPTER I.
A Short History and Classification of the Different
Kinds of Guardianship in the English and American Law.
The Guardian in England and America, performs
both the office of the Tutor and Curator of the Roman
Law. The species of Guardianship in the English law,
are as follows : (a) Nature, (b) Nurture, (c) Cocage,
(d) Chancery, (e) Ad litem, (f) Probate, (g) Testamen-
tary, (h) Chivalry, (i) Estoppel. These may be
grouped into two main divisions : 1. Those that exist
by operation of Law with out appointment being necessary,
they are as follows : (a) Guardian by Nature, (b) Nur-
ture, (c) Socage, (d) Estoppel; and 2. Those appointed
by the Courts, as (a) Guardian in Chancery, (b) Ad litem,
(c) Those appointed by the Probate and Surrogate Courts.
In this Country the Laws of inheritance have
wrought important changes upon the forms of Guardian-
ship of the first class. A Guardian by Natureby the
English law, had charge of the person, but not of the
property of the heir apparent until he reached the age
of twenty-one. This Guardianship did not extend to
the other children, and was vested in the father or in
case of his death, in the mother. Under the laws of
inheritance in the United States, by which all the child-
ren inherit equally, this guardianship extends. to all
the children, and is in fact, substantially q equiv-
alent to the relation of parent and child, and has
the usual legal consequences considered in law under
that topic. A Guardian by nurture also had charge
only of the child's person, but his right continued
only until the child became fourteen. This guardian-
ship applied to all the children except the heir ap-
parent, and was vested first in the father, and se-
condly in the mother. In this Country, where there
is no distinction between an heir apparent and other
children, it is the same as guardianship by nature.
A.Guardian in Socage had the custody of the infant's
lands as well as his person, but only of lands ob-
tained by descent. This Guardianship devolved upon the
next of kin who could not possibly inherit the estate.
It continued until the infant became fourteen, and would
then cease if the infant chose another Guardian, as
he might do. In some of the United States, this kind
of Guardianship still exists, though the rule that the
Guardian must be incapable of inheriting the estate,
has been generally changed. There may also be, by the
common law, a Guardian by estoppel; thus, when one
wrongly meddled with an infant's property, as by re-
ceiving the rents and profits, he would be called to
account as a Guardian, and would be estopped to deny
that he had acted in that capacity. In the first two
forms of Guardiarlship by appointment of the Court,the
appointment is mde by virtue of an inherent power in
the Court; in the last one, the power to appoint is
conferred by statute generally. In England the Court
of Chancery has, from an early period exercised the
power of appointing guardians to take the custody of
minors and their estates. In the United States, Courts
of Equity are generally vested with the same authority,
their power in this respect being generally prescribed
by Statute. A Guardian ad litem may be appointed by any
Court in which an action is pending to which the infant
is a party. It is quite common to confer power by
Statute upon Probate and Surrogate's Courts to appoint
Guardians. The infant if over fourteen, may usually
choose the guardian, but not if under fourteen. Such
Guardians were primarily under the control of the
Probate Courts, the Court of Chancery also had juris-
diction over them. Testamentary Guardians are those
appointed by the father's will. The Statute 12 Charles
11, which first gave this power in England, has generally
been adopted in this Country, or Statutes of similar
purport have been enacted. Such Guardians are also
under the control of Courts of Equity. Their powers
generally last during the wards minority, and extend
both to his person and property.
CHAPTER II.
The Guardian ad Litem, or Next Friend, treated
Historically, with Reference to the Early Common Law.
No part of the early Elnglish law was more dis-
jointed and incomplete than that which deals with the
Guardianship of infants. When it issued from the middle
ages, it knew some ten different kinds of Guardians,
and yet there was never laid down any definite rule
that there is or ought to be, a Guardian for every
infant. It had been thinking almost exclusively of
infant heirs, and had left other infants to shift for
themselves and to C-et Guardians as best they might, from
time to time, for the purposes of litigation. The law
had not been careful, even to give the father a right
to the custody of all his children; on the other hand,
however, it had given him a right to the custody of
the heir apparent only, whose marriage he was free to
sell. It looked at Guardianship and paternal power
merely as profitable rights, and, it only sanctioned
such rights when they could be made profitable. A
statute was required even, to convert the profitable
rights of the Guardian in socage into a trust to be
exercised for the infant's benefit. (Statute of
Marlboorough, Chap. 17). The law, at all events the
temporal law, was not at any pains to designate any
permanent Guardian for children who owned no land,
although the Ecclesiastical Courts did something to pro-
tect the interests of children by obliging Executors
and Administrators to retain for their use, any legacies
or parts to which they had become entitled. But all
infants had some rights which must be enforced. The
infant was incapable of enforcing them himself. How
then were they toc be enforced ? The infant could
not prosecute in person, so some person of full age
must conduct the litigation for him. In the year
1275, the third year of Edward the First's reign,
the Statute of Westminster II was passed, Chapter 48
of which reads as follows : "If a Guardian or chief
Knight enfeoff any man of land that is the inher-
itance of a child within age and is his ward, to the
disinheritance of the heir, it is provided; 1. That
the heir shall forthwith have his recovery by dis-
seisen against his Guardian and against the tenant. 2.Tho
seisen shall be delivered by the Justices if it be
received, or to the next friend if the heir to whom
the inheritance cannot descend, to improve to the use
of the heir and to answer for the issues until he shall
become of full age, and if the infant shall be carried
away by the Guardian or by the feoffee or by others,
by reason thereof he cannot sue, his action then may
be brought by his next friend, who will sue for him,
and shall be thereunto admitted." This was further
augmented in the year 1285 by the Statute of Westminster
II, Chapter 5, which reads as follows : "In every case
whereas such as be within age may sue, it is ordained
that if such as be within age and eloined so that they
cannot sue personally, their next friend shall be
admitted to sue for them." The Courts then, in all
cases when the infant could not sue for himself,
appointed a prochien amy as its officer to conduct
the suit for him, and to look after the interests of
the infant, and no appointment or subsequent con-
firmation by the infant was requisite; hor did it
matter at all whether he was cognizant of the proceed-
ings, or whether he be in the Country or abroad, he
cannot disavow the action. The judgment in the action
is binding on the infant, and he cannot, on attaining
age, commence fresh proceedings on the same cause of
action. The admission of the Prochien Ame to prose-
cute for an infant gives no authority to prosecute or
defend in any but the particular action or actions spec-
ified. A prochien amy who appears to be such upon
the record is priam facie liable for the payment of
costs. The practice is to compel the prochien army to
give security for costs, has not however, met with
uniform holdings in the early English law, two of which
directly opposite are hereby given. In the case of
Yarmouth vs. Mitchell, 2 B & R 423, the prochien amy
was thee father of the infant. The Court refused to make
the parent give security for the costs, though the
father was insolvent, while in Mann Vs. Burton, 4 M &
P 215, the prochien amy was not related to the infant,
and was sworn to be insolvent also; security for
costs, however, was required. Since the prochien amy
was in some courts liable for costs, in those courts
he could not be a witness.
CHAPTER III.
A short account of suits by infants in Equity.
An infant is incapable by himself of exhibiting
a Bill in Equity, as well on account of his supposed
want of discretion, as his inability to bind himself,
or to make himself liable for the costs of the suit.
Yet it is frequently requisite, in justice both to the
infant q and others, that his rights should be ascer-
tained and enforced without waiting until b he becomes
of age. For instance, there is no regular mode of,
calling an Executor to account for an infant's pro-
perty in his hands by a bill in Equity. Although there
may be no cause for litigation, it is frequently desir-
able to obtain for the infant the general protection
of Chancery. When, therefore, an infant claims a right,
or suffers an injury, on account of which it is nec-
essary to resort to the Court of Chancery, or when it is
desired he should become a ward ofthe Court, his
nearest relative is supposed to be the person who will
take him under his protection, and institute a suit to
assert his rights or vindicate his wrongs. The per-
son who institutes a suit on behalf of an infant in
Equity, is termed the next friend, but as it may happen
that the nearest relative himself witholds this right,
or does the injury complained of, or neglects to give
the protection to the infant which his consanguinity
or affinity calls upon him the give; the Court, in
favor of the infant, will permit any person to institute
suits on his behalf, and whoever acts thus the part
which the nearest relative ought to take, is also termed
the next friend of the infant. The consent of the
infant to a Bill filed in his name is not necessary
nor is his approbation or disapprobation of the pro-
ceedings regarded.
CHAPTER IV.
The General Law of the American Courts, with
Reference to the Liabilities, Rights, Powers and Duties
of the Guardian Ad Litem.
In England, the Guardian ad litem is always ap-
pointed by the Court, before the plaintiff can pro-
ceed in the action, and no legal right of parentage
or Guardianship t will enable anyone to act for the
infant without such appointment. The proceedings
in the appointment of the Guardian ad litem in the
United States, vary very greatly. In Conneticutt,
Massachusetts, Virginia, Maine, and Mississippi, no
entry of record is requisite admitting a person to
sue as Guardian ad litem or next friend. The recital
in the writ being deemed sufficient evidence of ad-
mission, while in Iowa, Alabama, Illinois, infancy
must first be proved to show the right to sue by next
friend. In this Country, more deference seems to be
shown to the infant's wishes than in England. V For
instance, in Massachusetts, the Court, on the personal
petition of a minor twenty years of age, withdrew the
authority of the Guardian ad litem, and ordered all
further proceedings in the action postponed until the
minor should attain full age, (Gould vs.Cranston, 8 Cush.
506), and even a minor of fourteen has been given much
latitude of discretion; when he c becomes of full age,
he may enter the fact upon the record and proceed to
conduct the action for himself, (Shuttlesworth vs.
Hughey, 6 Richmond 329).
Upon the question of liability for costs, there
is great diversity of opinion and holding in the
different States of the Union. In England, the Guar-
dian is universally liable for costs, and the remedy
against him is by attachment. In Massachusetts, Nebras-
ka, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine, the Guardian ad
litem is not liable for costs; and in the holding in
the case of Brown vs. Hall, 16 Vt. 673, the Court said,
by Hebard, Justice : "The next friend is not regarded
as a party to the suit at all, for any purpose what-
ever.
An infant can appear and defend in civil suits
by Guardian ad litem only; he cannot answer by next frie
friend. The process is the same as in all ordinary
cases, and every Court wherein an infant sues or is
sued, has power to appoint a Guardian ad litem for the
purposes of the suit. The Guardian ad litem is one
appointed generally for the infant to defend in a par-
ticular action brought 4ainst him, or to bring a
particular action for him, and must be distinguished
from the Guardian of the person and estate. The Guar-
dian must not be a person with interests adverse to
those of the infant, and the rules which have been
mentioned previously as applying to the prochien amy,
may be said to apply in general, to the Guardian ad
litem. The two correspond, and the principles of law
applicable to one are in general to be applied to the
other.
An interesting question may o perhaps be brought
up here as to the effect of a judgment when no Guardian
is appointed. There are a variety of holdings in the
different States upon this question. It seems, by the
decided weight of opinion, however, that the judgment
is not void, but voidable. This is the holding in the
following States : Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois,
Indianna, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Massachusetts,
Vermont, Nebraska, California, Florida, North Carolina
and New York. A typical and 'recent case is Millard
vs. Marmon, 116 IIi. 649, the facts of which were as
follows : It was an action of debt, brought by
William M. Marmon against one Millard, on a judgment
which the plaintiff had recovered before a Justice of the
Peace. The plea of infancy was put in by the defendant
and also that nb Guardian ad litem had been appointed
for him by the Court. The Court said, by Mr. Justice
,regg "The question has often been raised as to the
vaildity of a judgment rendered against a minor where
no Guardian ad litem has been appointed for him, and
so far as we know, the decisions are uniform, that
Such judgment is not void, but voidable, and a failure
to appoint the Guardian ad litem is merely an irre-
gularity." But it has been held to be void in the case
of Nicholas vs. Wellborn, 13 Ga. 467; Finley vs. Rob-
inson, 17 So. Carolina 439; Taylor vs. Robinson 26
Texas 293. But however, the judgment of the Court
cannot be attacked collaterally. It is held in South
Carolina that a minor can commence an action, but he
will be nonsuited at the trial, unless some one be
appointed his Guardian ad litem, (McDaniels vs. Nich-
olson, 2 Reports for Constitutional Courts 344).
The infant may sue by his next friend, though he have
a Guardian, if the Guardian does not dissent, in Texas
and Vermont. In some States the rule is even more
liberal, as in Alabama, where it is held that the in-
fant may in every case sue by his next friend. When
an action is brought by an infant, he sues in his own
name, by a certain person as next friend. A prochien
amy commences his authority with a written declaration,
and can only maintain actions for such causes as may be
prosecuted without special demand, as for personal in-
juries done the infant , or for sums of money, where
the writ itself is considered as a demand. The old
practice in FMngland as to the appointment of a prochien
amy, was for the person intended as prochien amy to
attend with the infant before a Judge at Chambers, who
granted what was called a fiat, for one of the Masters
to draw up the rule, or if it was in a Court of Law,
the Judge would at once grant the admission. The ad-
mission was left with the Clerk, or Register of the
Court, and the ruel was entered in the Office of the
Clerk or Register. A copy of the rule or admission
was annexed to the declaration before it was served.
If the prochien amy and infant could not attend, a
petition was written and signed by the infant, praying
to be admitted to prosecute his action by the person
proposed as his Guardian, and stating the cause of
action in the petition. At the foot of the petition
the Guardian signed his consent to act for the plaintiff
or defendant. To this -,as annexed an affidavit of the
signing of the petition and consent, and then all was
presented to the Judge of the Court, who granted his
fiat or admission, and the same was filed. This is
substantially the practice today in a great r-any of the
American States, but it is largely regulated by Statute
in all the jurisdictions.
CHAPTER V.
The Guardian ad Litem in New York, with Special
Reference to Procedure under the Code.
The following are the Sections : "Vhen an infant
has a right of action, he is entitled to maintain action
thereon, and the same shall not be delayed or deferred
on account of his infancy". -Sec. 468.
"Before a summons is issued in the name of an
infant plaintiff, a competent and responsible person
must be appointed to appear as his Guardian for the
purposes of the action, who shall be responsible for
the costs thereof." - Sec. 469.
If the next friend is irresponsible, proceedings
will be staid till security for costs is given, or a
responsible person bubstituted for the next friend.
(Robertson vs. Robertson, 3 Paige 387.) If the
person appointed for the plaintiff's guardian is not
pecuniarily responsible, the defendant must raise the
objection as soon as he learns of the appointment.
(Wise vs. Insurance Co. 7 Daly 258.) A guardian ad
litem is responsible for costs, although the Code does
not require him to file security therefor. (Steinburg
vs. Manhattan Ry. Co. 10 Week. Dig. 346.) Failure
to appoint a Guardian for an infant plaintiff does not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction in the q action.
(Simms vs. College, 35 Hun 344.) However, the defendant
may move to set aside the summons etc for irregularity.
(Freyber vs. Pelerin, 24 How. 202.) After answer
served a defendant is too late to move to set aside
proceedings on the ground that the action is prosecuted
without the appointment of a Guardian.( Parks vs. Parks,
19 Abbott 161.)
The Guardian must be appointed upon the application
of the infant if he is of the age of fourteen years
or upwards, or if he is under that age, upon the ap-
plication of his general or testamentary guardian if he
has one, or of a relative or friend. If the applica-
tion is made by a relative or friend, notice thereof
must be given to his general or testamentary Guardian
if he has one, or to the person with whom the infant
resides". - Sec. 470.
A Guardian ad litem cannot be appointed for an in-
fant over fourteen years of age without the infant's con-
sent. (28 Barber 299).
"An infant defendant must also appear by Guardian,
who must be a competent and responsible person, ap-
pointed upon the application of the infant if he is of
the age of fourteen years or upward-s, and applies
within twenty days after personal service of the sum-
mons; or if he is under that age, or neglects so to
apply, upon the application of any other party to the
action, or of a relative or friend of the infant. Where
the application is made by a person other than the in-
fant, notice thereof must be given to his general or
testamentary Guardian if he has one within the State,
or if he has none, to the infant himself, if he is of
the age of fourteen years or upwards and within the
State, or if he is underv that age and within the
State, to the person with whom he resides." - Sec. 471.
A guardian ad litem can only be regularly appointed
for an infant defendant after personal or substituted
service. (Ingersol vs. Mangam, 84 N.Y.622.) And the
appointment of a Guardian ad litem for an infant who
had not been served with summons is void. ( Glover vs.
laws, 19 Abbott 161).. The person selected for Guardian
should be the one most likely to protect the rights of
the infant. (Grant vs. Schoonhoven, 9 Paige 255.)
"The Court in which the action is brought, or a
Judge thereof, or if the action is brought in the
Supreme Court, the County Judge of the County where the
action is triable, may appoint a Guardian ad litem
for an infant, either plaintiff or defendant. The
Clerk must act in that capacity for an infant defendant,
where the Court or the Judge appoints him. No person
other than the Clerk shall be appointed a Guardian ad
litem unless his written consent, duly acknowledged is
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produced to the Court or Judge making the appointment." -
Sec. 472.
"Where an infant defendant resides out of the
State, or resides within the State and is temporarily
absent therefrom, the Court may, in its discretion,
make an order designating a person to be his Guardian
ad litem, unless he or someone in his behalf, procure
such a Guardian to be appointed as prescribed in the last
two sections within a specified time after service of
a copy of the order. The Court must give special di-
rections in the order respecting the service thereof,
which may be upon the infant. The swmons may be
served by delivering a copy to the Guardian so appointed
with like effect as where a summons is served without
the State upon an adult defendant, pursuant to an order
for that purpose, except that the time to appear or
answer is twenty days after the service of the sum-
mons exclusive of the day of service." - Sec. 473.
"Except in a case where it is otherwise especially
prescribed by law, a Guardian appointed for an infant
as prescribed inb this article, shall not be permitted
to receive money or property of the infant, other
than costs and expenses allowed to the Guardian by the
Court until he has given sufficient security, approved
by a Judge of the Court or a County Judge, to account
for and apply the same under the direction of the Court".
Sec. 474.
"The security must be a bond to the infant, in
such penalty as the Judge directs, not less than
twice the sum or the value of the property, to be re-
ceived, exceuted by the Guardiun and at least two
sureties approved by the Judge, and filed in the Office
of the Clerk. The infant or any other party to the
action may afterwards apply for an order directing
a new bond to be given with an increased penalty or
the Court may so direct of its ovm motion". - Sec. 475.
"The last two sections do not apply to the general
Guardian of the infant who has been appointed as a
Guardian ad litem as prescribed in this article; but
the Court may at any time require the General Guardian
to give additional security for the faithful dis-
charge of his trust, before receiving money or property
of an infant, under a judgment or order in the action".-
Sec. 476.
"A person appointed Guardian as prescribed in this
article, for an infant defendant in an action, is not
liable for the costs of the action unless specially
charged therewith by the order of the Court for personal
misconduct." - Sec. 477.
Guardian ad litem for infant in Partition.
An action for the Partition of real property
shall not be brought by an infant, except by the written
authority of the Surrogate of the County in which the
property or a part thereof is situated. The authority
shall not be given unless the Surrogate is satisfied by
affidavit or other competent evidence that the interests
of the infant will be promoted by bringing the action.
A judgment for a partition or sale shall not be rendered
in such an action unless the Court is satisfied that
the interests of the infant will be promoted thereby,
and that fact is expressly recited in the judgment".-
Sec. 1534.
" A guardian ad litem for an infant party in an
action for partition can be appointed only by the
Court".- Sec. 1535.
A general Guardian appointed by the Surrogate
cannot act for an infant defendant. There must be a
Guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. (Clark vs.
Clark, 14 Abbott 299.) A Guardian ad litem for an
infant cannot be appointed until the infant is brought
into Court by personal or substituted service.(Walter vs.
DeGraff, 19 Abb. N.C. 406.) If no Guardian has been
appointed the decree ordering the sale is irregular
and the error cannot be cured, though the infant has
come of age and tendered a release. (Kohler vs. Koh-
ler, 2 Edwards 69.)
"The security tobe given f by the Guardian ad litem
for an infant party in an action for partition must be
a bond, to the People of the State, executed by him and
one or more sureties as the Court directs, in a stun
fixed by the Court, conditioned for the faithful dis-
charge of the trust committed to him as Guardian, and
to render a just and true account of his Guardianship in
any Court or place when required. The bond must be
filed with the Clerk, before the Guardian enters upon
the execution of his duties, and it cannot be dispensed
with, although he is the general Guardian of the in-
fant".- Sec. 1536.
The bond must be executed by the Guardian himself.
A bond by sureties in his behalf, in which he does not
join is not sufficient. (Jennings vs. Jennings 2 Abbott
6.) An order of the Court, appointing a Guardian ad
litem of the defendant in partition, which fails to
direct the Guardian to give a bond in compliance with
this section, is fatally defective. (Walter vs. DeGraff
19 Abb. N.C. 406. Even if the Clerk of the Court is
appointed such Guardian he must give security. (Fisher
vs. Lyon, 34 Hun 183)
"A commissioner or other officer making a sale,
as prescribed in this title, or a guardian of an infant
party to the action, shall not, nor shall any person for
his benefit, directly or indirectly, purchase or be in-
terested in the purchase of any of the property sold,
except that a guardian may, where he I is lawfully
authorized so to do, purchase for the benefit or in
behalf of the ward." - Sec. 1679.
A purchase by a Guardian ad litem of an infant
party to a partition suit of land sought to be parti-
tioned in such suit, for his omi benefit, is void. (Le-
fevre vs. Laraway, 22 Barb. 667).
"The Guardian ad litem of an infant in whose favor
an action is brought, must, unless he is also the Gen-
teral Guardian, execute and file with the Clerk, before
the commencement of the action, a bond to the infant,
with at least two sufficient sureties, in a penalty
fixed by a Judge of the Court, conditioned that the
Guardian will fully account to the infant when he
attains full age, or in case of his death, to his per-
sonal representatives, for all money or property which
the Guardian may receive by reason of a legacy or
distributive share". - Sec. 1820.
"Where costs are awarded against an infant plain-
tiff, they may be collected by execution or otherwise,
from his Guardian ad litem, in like manner as if the
latter was the plaintiff".- Sec. 3249.
But, after arriving at majority an infant plain-
tiff, for whom a guardian ad litem had been appointed,
continues the action under his own management, without
any change of title, and judgment was entered against
him for the costs, held that the guardian ad litem
was not liable for the costs. (Sparmann vs. Keim, 6 Abb.
N.C. 353.)
"Before a summons is issued in behalf of, or an
issue is joined without summons, by an infant plaintiff,
the Justice must appoint a competent and responsible
person, nominated by the plaintiff or his general guard-
ian to appear as his guardian for the purposes of 'he
action. The written consent of the person so appointed
must be filed with the Justice before his appoint-
ment. The Guardian so appointed is responsible for the
costs."- Sec. 2887.
"After the service and return of a summons against
an infant defendant, no other proceeding shall be
taken in the action until a person has been appointed
to appear as his Guardian for the purpose of the action,
Upon the nomination of the defendant, the justice must
appoint a proper person for that purpose. If the de-
fendant does not appear upon the return of the summons,
or if he neglects or refuses to nominate, the justice
may, on the application of the plaintiff, appoint any
proper person as his guardian. The written consent of
the person so appointed must be filed with the Justice
before his appointment. The Guardian so appointed is
not responsible for any costs". - Sec. 2888.
When the fact of infancy is first disclosed on the
trial, the Justice should dismiss the action, and such
Judgment of dismissal will not bar a second action. (Har-
vey vs. Large, 51 Barb. 222.)
Proceedings in Surrogate's Courts.
"Where a person cited or to be cited is an infant
of the age of fourteen years or upwards, the Surrogate
may in his discretion, e with or without an application
therefor, and in the interest of that person, make an
order requiring that a copy off the citation be deliv-
ered in behalf of that person, to a person designated in
the order, and that service of the citation shall not
be deemed complete until such delivery. Where the
person cited or to be cited is an infant under the age
of fourteen years, and the Surrogate has reasonable
ground to believe that the interests of the person to
whom a copy of the citation was delivered in behalf
of the infant, is adverse to that of the infant, or
that for any reason he is not a fit person to protect
the latter's rights, the Surrogate may likewise make
such an order; and as a part thereof or by a seperate
order made in like manner; at any stage of the pro-
ceedings he may appoint a special guradian ad litem to
conduct the proceedings in behalf of the incompetent
person". - Sec. 2527.
"Where a party who is an infant does not appear
by his general guardian; or where a party who is a
lunatic, idiot, or habitual drunkard, does not appear
by his committee, the Surrogate must appoint a competent
and responsible person to appear o as Special Guardian
for that party. Where an infant appears by his general
guardian, or where a lunatic, idiot or habitual drunk-
ard appears by his committee, the Surrogate must in-
quire into the facts, and must, in like manner ap-
ppoint a special guardian, if there is any ground to
suppose that the interests of the general guardian or
committee is adverse to that of the infant or incom-
petent person, or that for any other reason the inter-
ests of the latter require the appointment of a Spe-
cial Guardian. A person cannot be appointed such a
Special Guardian unless his written consent is filed,
at or before the time of entering the order appointing
him." - Sec. 2530
The appointment of an improper person to be the
Special Guardian of an infant is not per se a ground
for reversing the Surrogate's order, refusing to set
aside the decree upon motion after the time to appeal
has expired. (Story vs. Dayton 22 Hun 450.)
The parent of an infant party to a special pro-
ceeding in Surrogate's Court, cannot appear as Guardian
ad litem for his ward. (The matter of Bowne, 6 Den. 51.)
"Where a person other than the infant or the
committee of the incompetent person applys for the
appointment of a Special Guardian as prescribed in the
last section, at least eight days notice of the
application must be personally served upon the infant
or incompetent person if he is within the State, and also
upon the committee, if any, in like manner as a cita-
tion is required by law to be served".- Sec. 2531.
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General Duties of the Guardiai Ad Litem.
It is the duty of the Guardian ad litem to pro-
secute for the plaintiff, to ascertain his rights, and
to bring them to the notice of the Court. (Knicker-
bocker vs. DeFreest, 2 Paige 304.)
In executing a deed, he should sign the infant's name
to it, and add 'by A B, his guardian ad litem'. (Hyatt
vs. Seeley, 11 N.Y. 52.)
In the case of Knickerbocker vs. DeFreest, supra,
Chancelor Walworth in his opinion, said : "It is the
duty of the Guardian ad litem in every case to ascer-
tain from the infant and his friends, or fromother
proper sources of information, the legal and equitable
rights of the ward. If a special answer is necessary
or advisable for the purpose of bringing the rights of
the infant properly before the Court, it is his duty to
put in such an answer. If the infant has no defense
against the complaint, and no equitable rights as
against his co-defendant which render a special answer
necessary, the general answer will be sufficient. If
the infant has any substantial rights which may be in-
juriously affected by proceedings in the cause, or if
the claim against him is of doubtful character, it is
also the duty of the Guardian ad litem to attend before
the Court on the hearing and the taking of testimony in
the case, and on all other proper occasions to bring
forward and protect the rights of the ward."
The Guardian ad litem, must, like other agents and
attorneys, act in good faith towards the infant, and
take no advantage of the office for his personal gain,
and all te benefits derived from his position, will
inure to the benefit of the infant. (Spelman vs. Terry,
8 Hun 205.)
If the Guardian neglects his duties, in conse-
quence of which the rights of the infant are not pro-
perly attended to or are neglected, he may be punished
for such neglect. He will also in such case, be
liable to the infant for all damages he may sustain.
(Knickerbocker vs. DeFreest, supra.)
In concluding, I wouild say, I have endeavored to
give a short outline of the rights, powers and duties of
the Guardian ad litem, with special reference to pro-
cedure in New York. I have also endeavored to give
a short sketch of Guardianship under the Roman law,
and of proceedings in the early Chancery Courts of Eng-
land. Owing to the somewhat limited scope of this
branch of the law, and from the fact that in this
Country most of it is purely statutory; it has been
impossible, in some cases , to treat the matter as
fully as I should liked to have done.
